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No wonder! No wonder that our sophisticated 
civilisations, brimming with the accumulated 
knowledge of so many traditions, continue to fl atten 
and dismember every part of the breathing earth.… 
For we have written all of these wisdoms down on the 
page, effectively divorcing these many teachings from 
the living land that once held and embodied these 
teachings. Once inscribed on the page, all this wisdom 
seemed to have an exclusively human provenance.
David Abram (2010: 281)
As someone interested in the relationship 
between performance and the earth, I fi nd myself 
simultaneously enthused and perturbed by this 
impassioned statement from the 
phenomenologist and anthropologist David 
Abram. Initially, Abram’s plea for an animist way 
of re-engaging with knowledge appears to 
possess good ecological sense.1 Through its 
critique of ‘the deadness’ of written language 
– what he goes on to describe as ‘illumination … 
set down in unchanging form’ (281) – his 
comments call out for a new type of sensate 
thinking. This would be one in which thinkers 
acknowledge, tap into and transmit what we may 
see as a ‘non-human’ energy, born from the 
heterogeneous folds and refrains that traverse 
the milieu in which they cannot help but 
participate.2 To borrow from Isabelle Stengers, 
who is sympathetic to Abram’s position, the 
knowledge gleaned from an affi rmation of this 
energy allows for ‘a reclamation of animism’ 
(2012) – that is to say, an attunement to an 
autonomous world that exists beyond the narrow 
correlationism of Enlightenment philosophy and 
which does not, necessarily, entail a return to the 
type of primitivist, supernatural cosmos that 
Western anthropology has associated with 
animist practices from the nineteenth century 
onwards.3
Reclaiming animism does not mean, then, that 
we have ever been animist. Nobody has ever been 
animist because one is never ‘animist in general’, 
only in terms of assemblages that generate 
metamorphic transformation in our capacity to affect 
and be affected – and also to feel, think, and imagine. 
(2012)
1 For more on the 
relationship between 
ecology, language and 
animism in Abram’s work, 
see the chapters ‘The 
Ecology of Magic’ and 
‘Animism and the 
Alphabet’ in The Spell of the 
Sensuous: Perception and 
language in a more-than-
human world (1996: 3–30, 
93–136).
2 It is interesting to note 
the parallels here with 
Walter Benjamin’s 
Proustian take on thinking 
and feeling as experiences 
‘not located in the head’, 
but as always bound up 
with the very place where 
they came into being 
(2009: 54).
3 While Stengers endorses 
Abram’s position, she is 
also reluctant to share the 
entirety of his views on 
animism. She notes: ‘In 
contrast to David Abram, 
whose experience enables 
him to turn the animist 
modes of experience, 
awareness, and knowledge 
into an intensely powerful 
bridge-making tool, as 
a generative constraint 
I must accept to not feel 
free to speak and speculate 
in a way that would situate 
others’ (2012). Stengers’ 
reserve stems from her 
scientifi c background and 
also from a desire not to 
‘categorize others’ (2012).
4 As other contributors to 
this edition have explained, 
the term the ‘new animism’ 
comes from Graham 
Harvey (2005).
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As Stengers implies with her endorsement 
of Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s notion 
of assemblage, reclaiming animism today has 
more to do with exposing oneself to the touch of 
some non-human outside than with a Western 
understanding (and possible appropriation) of 
indigenous knowledge systems. The point of 
the ‘new animism’, as Stengers never tires of 
repeating, is fundamentally transformative.4 
The objective is not to determine whether 
a thought or belief is ‘really’ true or not, but 
in how that belief allows for more generative 
and intimate ways of being in the world. Quite 
simply, animism, for Stengers and also for 
Abram, is a pragmatic theory and practice 
of becoming animated, allowing oneself to 
be suffused with the breath of the world. 
Stengers insists:
Reclaiming means recovering what we have been 
separated from, but not in the sense that we can 
just get it back. Recovering means recovering from 
the very separation itself, regenerating what this 
separation has poisoned.… A poisoned milieu must 
be reclaimed, and so must many of our words, those 
that – like ‘animism’ and ‘magic’ – carry with them 
the power to take us hostage: do you ‘really’ believe 
in …? (2012)
While Stengers and Abram largely restrict 
themselves to philosophical and anthropological 
terms, it does not take a great leap of thought to 
see that for them aesthetics might be one of the 
places where Western culture has the potential 
to escape the violence of its own colonial 
project. As Abram explains, Western thought, as 
a consequence of its logocentrism, has forgotten 
what produced it in the first place: namely, the 
vibrant materiality of its milieu, the power of the 
organic and inorganic world to leave an impress 
on bodies, to stimulate acts of creative poesis – 
what he refers to, lyrically, as ‘the moon’s dance 
in and out of the clouds’ or ‘the dazzle of the 
sunlight on the wind-rippled surface of mountain 
tarn’ (2010: 281).
All of this I am in agreement with.
Ecology is inherently animistic, in the extent to 
which it decentres human agency, and, as Gregory 
Bateson (1972), Bruno Latour (1993) and Félix 
Guattari (2000) have all shown in different ways, 
places the anthropos in a network of systems that 
replaces ‘individualism’ with ‘dividualism’ – the 
idea that the human subject is constituted by, and 
is always already part of, non-human processes 
and things that transcend the intentionality of its 
consciousness and boundaries of self. To argue for 
a reclamation of animism, then, in the way that 
Stengers theorizes and Abram practises, is to 
endorse an ecology of perception; to affirm that 
all human thought and feeling is produced in and 
by our participation in a creative cosmos that we 
can never master or control. The logic of such 
a move is to help to create a new ecological 
habitus that may play a part in a wider 
ethico-political strategy to alleviate the deadly 
spectre of the Anthropocene, an economically 
obsessed era that, as Bernard Stiegler has recently 
diagnosed, ‘imposes an entropic becoming 
without a future’ (2018: 75).5
And yet … 
There is something problematic in Abram’s 
own writing, a paradoxical sentimentalism that 
causes suspicion. His romanticized images and 
metaphors, drawn as they are from a pristine 
view of the natural world, are, I think, at best 
domesticating and, at worst, clichéd. While they 
may allow for enchantment – the ‘spell of the 
sensuous’ (Abram 1996) – they tend to posit the 
animating pulse of the world as something benign 
and comforting, a reassuring sublimity. However, 
if we are to take animism seriously today – and 
I use the term in its ‘new’ sense to describe 
a world brimming with affective exchanges as 
opposed to yet another colonialist appropriation 
of indigenous knowledge – then it is imperative 
that we acknowledge the agency of the earth in 
a very different way. In the Anthropocene, to 
make the prognosis as Stengers does, that we 
are ‘not alone in the world’ (2012) is far from 
reassuring. On the contrary, it entails a difficult 
affirmation. In a world beset with climate change 
and other ‘blowbacks’ caused by the nature-
culture assemblage, animism is coterminous 
with what geographer Nigel Clark points to as 
a ‘dynamic, unpredictable planet’ (2011: 5) that 
human knowledge can never master or control. 
Instead then of taking our animist metaphors 
from some nostalgic and retrograde modernist 
image bank, it may be more beneficial to mould 
them from the unpredictable and compromised 
earth of our own times. Such a shift would 
have the benefit not only of avoiding the ‘cruel 
optimism’ (Berlant 2011) inherent in an overly 
5 Stiegler’s idea is very 
different from the 
geological usage of the 
word. For Stiegler, the 
Anthropocene describes an 
age of total and utter 
nihilism and entropy, the 
death of time and desire, 
‘the total 
proletarianization of the 
mind itself’ (2018: 63). 
Against the sheer 
destructiveness of 
Anthropocenic becoming, 
Stiegler posits the 
Neganthropocene, a way of 
rethinking deferral that 
would allow for a proper 
future to emerge, that is to 
say, as something 
uncontrollable, even 
‘improbable’ (63).
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sentimentalized view of ‘nature’ that always 
posits the earth as an inherent good until it turns 
against humans. Just as crucially, it may produce 
more helpful forms of awareness that would 
allow humans to recognize their own fragility and 
responsibility, to create a generative ‘undoing’, 
one might say. In what follows, I will attempt 
to articulate the ambiguity of my response to 
Abram by focusing on Lee Hassall’s film Return to 
Battleship Island (2013). In my analysis of the film, 
I want to advance and express what an animist 
mode of visual criticism may entail, in terms of 
critical thought and expression. The objective is 
to gesture towards an alternative way of making 
and thinking about art that looks beyond the 
positive but nevertheless problematic mode of 
enchantment inherent in Abram’s citation and 
which remains dormant, too, in Stengers’ ideas.
In the Performance Research issue on ‘Ruins 
and Ruination’ that I edited in 2015 with Richard 
Gough, I looked at Return to Battleship Island 
as a work that sought to combat the aesthetics 
of ruin porn – the tendencies of contemporary 
photographers and film-makers to void the ruins 
of our post-industrial present of both history and 
temporality (see Lavery and Hassall 2015: 112–25). 
In this article, I want to supplement and extend 
my earlier argument with a new theoretical 
perspective, one rooted in animism, and which 
attempts to show how ruins can come alive once 
more and ‘touch us’ in and through the very act or 
process of being represented – as something then 
very distinct to ruin porn. In 2015, I did not have 
the language of animism to hand in my attempt 
to understand the affective economy of the film, 
the way in which it performs on the bodies of 
spectators and allows for non-entropic becomings 
that are simultaneously ontological, political and 
ecological. In other words, animism provides the 
(necessary) frame that was missing in my initial 
attempt to communicate what I believe to be at 
stake in the film.
T H E  S I T E
In the Summer of 2013, I led an interdisciplinary 
group of scholars on an AHRC-funded research 
project to map the ecological future of the island 
of Hashima in Japan, a place that is situated 16–
18 kilometres or so off the coast of Nagasaki City 
on the southern tip of the Japanese archipelago. 
Intriguingly with respect to Stengers’ emphasis 
on reclamation we called the project ‘The Future 
of Ruins: Reclaiming toxicity and abandonment’ 
(AH/K005308/1). The island had been acquired 
by the Mitsubishi Company in 1890, and is now 
a toxic wasteland as a result of a century or 
so of offshore strip mining, and the effects of 
long-term radiation – the fallout – caused by the 
detonation of the second atom bomb, the Fat 
Man, over the skies of Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. 
After a period of intense prosperity during the 
second Japanese economic miracle of the 1950s, 
the island was abandoned in 1974 at lightning 
speed in the wake of the OPEC oil crisis the 
previous year. Hashima, then, quickly fell into 
a state of disrepair. Its reinforced modernist tower 
blocks, the earliest examples of such buildings in 
Japan, left to rot in the sun.
However, in the past decade or so, the dramatic 
landscape of the island, this space of ruined 
modernity among the waves, has attracted 
numerous artists, film-makers and photographers, 
all of whom, in their different ways, tend to see 
the island as a type of commodity, a place to be 
represented and imaged again and again, in such 
a way that the environmental damage inflicted 
upon Hashima is washed away, aestheticized out 
of all purview.6 To use the language of Jacques 
Rancière, we might say the island has been 
accommodated into a normative distribution, 
a mode of sensible configuration, in which there 
is no dispute, no dissensus, over its meaning, its 
significance (Rancière 2006: 12–20). 
Paradoxically, the more that Hashima is 
represented, the less we actually see it. As with 
other ruined cities such as Detroit, Hashima is 
now a place of ‘ruin porn’, an image shorn of 
history and affect, its sensuality a mere mirage. 
To look at in the plethora of images that depict it 
is, all too often, to be placed outside of it. The 
temptation is to dominate the island from 
a distance.
In the essay mentioned above, I described 
how Return to Battleship Island is a conscious 
attempt, on Hassall’s part, to offer a different 
way of ‘looking’ at Hashima island, characterized 
by the production of a mobile and jumbled 
temporality that seeks to provide the ruins 
with a future beyond the static space of the 
6 See, for instance, the work 
of the photographers Yves 
Marchand and Romain 
Meffre, who, in their 
coffee-table book 
Gunkanjima (2013), depict 
Hashima as a sublime 
example of ruination. 
There are no history or 
people in their images and 
the aesthetic is exactly the 
same as the one they used 
to represent Detroit. As 
opposed to Hassall’s film, 
everything is still and 
static. The viewer is the 
master of all they survey. 
An alternative mode of 
representing ruins is found 
in Nicolas Geyrhalter’s film 
Homo Sapiens (2016). In 
this long, durational work, 
the section of the film that 
concentrates on Hashima 
is connected to a larger 
meditation on abandoned 
futures in Europe and Asia. 
In it, Hashima resonates 
with the failure of Japanese 
capitalism, especially the 
economic problem of 
stagflation. Geyrhalter’s 
images are pensive; they 
provoke questions and ask 
spectators to think with 
them.
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screen. What I did not mention, however, is 
that in my experiences of watching the fi lm 
with an audience, this distribution has been 
misunderstood and sometimes overlooked. For 
the thirty-minute duration of the fi lm, which 
moves silently and relentlessly between images 
of the sea and fragmented images of the concrete 
island, spectators shuffl e, whisper, type on their 
iPads, check their phones, cough, scratch and 
itch. They seem bemused, and in post-show 
discussions they often express a sense of anger 
and disappointment caused by Hassall’s refusal 
to give a stable representation of the island that 
would allow them to take it all in – to consume 
it, one might say – in a single take. Ultimately, 
the fi lm, through the syncopated rhythm of its 
editing, exists as a virtual ‘thing’ that touches us, 
that seeks to become, in Laura Marks’ word, a type 
of ‘skin’ (2000). This skin, moreover, does not 
simply provide a limit to the image, a barrier that 
would contain and circumscribe its being. On the 
contrary, it allows the images that mobilize the 
screen to breathe, to emit an invisible and virtual 
radiance that targets the central nervous system, 
getting into the bloodstream, deregulating the 
heartbeat. The point of the fi lm is not to show, 
but to transport – and through that transport to 
emit a ‘pharmacological’ spell, to heal through 
poisoning. In this respect the fi lm is, to use Gilles 
Deleuze’s terminology, both ‘critical and clinical’ 
at the same time (1999: lv), a doubleness that has 
parallels with Abram’s notion of the restorative 
powers of animist representation. But with the 
critical difference that Hassall’s animism is not 
predicated on some pre-lapsarian return to 
‘nature’. Rather Hassall prefers to site his work in 
the poisoned soil of our Anthropocene present, 
in the toxic discharge of a ruined site. Crucially, 
Return to Battleship Island does not simply 
represent ruins; it exists as part of an affective 
dispositif of ruination, an apparatus that ruins as 
it represents, becoming the ‘process’ it purports 
to show.
A N I M I S M  A N D  T H E  E C O L O G I C A L  I M A G E
In the last sentence of her 1977 collection On 
Photography, Susan Sontag suggests that, ‘If there 
can be a better way for the real world to include 
the imaginary, it will require an ecology not only 
of real things but of images as well’ (2005: 141). 
Sontag’s anxiety, her call for a ‘conservationist 
remedy’ for photography, is caused by the fact 
that, for her, as for Guy Debord, images erode the 
real, and so facilitate post-industrial capitalism’s 
obsession with spectacle and discipline: ‘Cameras 
defi ne reality in the two ways essential to the 
workings of an advanced industrial society: 
as a spectacle (for masses) and as an object of 
surveillance (for rulers)’ (140).
■ A wave over a ruin in 
Hashima. ©Lee Hassall
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Although pivotal in expanding the field of 
eco-criticism to include images and not simply 
words, Sontag’s viewpoint is limited. First, 
her hostility towards the ‘eye’ means that she 
ignores the power of images to ‘counter their 
role as technological recruits in the war against 
environmental reality’ (Ross 1994: 336). Second, 
by using ecology as a metaphor for thinking 
about human culture and society alone, she 
overlooks how images have a more complex and 
possibly progressive role in determining how we 
mediate and determine our relationship with 
the ‘natural environment’ itself. As the political 
theorist Franco Berardi notes: ‘The repertoire of 
images at our disposal limits, exalts, amplifies, or 
circumscribes the forms of life and events that, 
through our imagination, we can project onto the 
world, build and inhabit’ (2011: 133).
The philosopher Michel Serres advances an 
alternative approach to the ecology of the image 
that has closer affinities with how I use it in this 
article. In Malfeasance: Appropriation through 
pollution, Serres proposes that pollution be 
understood in terms of a dialectic between ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ forms of toxicity:
By the [hard] I mean on the one hand solid residues, 
liquids, gases, emitted through the atmosphere by 
big industrial companies or gigantic garbage dumps, 
the shameful signature of big cities. By the [soft], 
tsunamis of writing, signs, images, and logos flooding 
civic, public and natural spaces as well as landscape 
with their advertising. (2011: 41)
For Serres, images do not simply function 
like natural ecosystems, as Sontag supposes 
in her notion of conservation. Rather, they are 
ecosystems in their own right directly impacting 
on how humans exist within the world and earth, 
as well as with each other.
What is key about Serres’ argument is that the 
ecological image does not have to exist as an 
image of ecology, that is to say, a direct 
representation of nature, as Abram wants. More 
expansively, if obliquely, its ecological value 
resides in the way it affects, in the atmosphere it 
emits. Where toxic images animate in 
a destructive sense by stimulating ever greater 
desires to consume, leading to a perverse erasure 
of connections and interdependencies, an 
ecological image is one that decentres and 
‘decreates’, exposing the spectator to non-human 
forces that have potential to point to a different 
way of existing. In Genesis, for instance, Serres, in 
a discussion of the fictitious painting La Belle 
noiseuse, says that images have the power to 
‘invent new musics and new harmonies’ 
(1995: 24), disclosing, he says, ‘possible worlds’ 
(25).7 Importantly, such ‘possibilisation’ arises 
when the image is of such intensity that the 
object depicted loses its discreteness and becomes 
instead a conduit for chaos: ‘Everything is 
founded in the possible, all representations 
originate in La Belle noiseuse, all states come to us 
from chaos’ (24). When painters are able to tap 
the pre-individual, impersonal forces of chaos, 
the image, Serres tells us, is no longer something 
we look at; it becomes, rather, a living entity, 
a milieu that we are folded into, a sea whose roar 
– whose noise – animates us:
La Belle noiseuse is not a picture, it is the noise of 
beauty, the naked multiple, the numerous seas, 
from which a beautiful Aphrodite is born.… La Belle 
noiseuse is not a painting, not a representation, 
not a work; it is the master, the wellspring, the 
black box that comprises, implicates, envelops, in 
other words: buries all profiles, all appearances, all 
representations, and finally the work itself. (19)
Serres’ analysis of La Belle noiseuse shows how 
the ecological image is an animist image, at least 
with respect to the terms proposed by Stengers. 
This is an image, moreover, that needs to be 
carefully composed to the point where the object 
represented, as in Hassall’s pictures of Hashima, 
is always on the verge of toppling into the forces 
of chaos that it harnesses and emerges from. 
Instead, then, of establishing a solid ground for 
the spectatorial eye, the editing process puts 
objects and spectators in motion, transforming 
itself, in the process, into a dance, a gymnastics, 
a kind of visual animism. Or as Serres has it: 
‘We are all in search of what Plato named the 
chôra, a smooth and blank space prior to the sign: 
it is the dancer’s body and it is the blank page, 
the virginal wax, where the choreographer writes.’ 
(44)
A N I M I S T  T H I N K I N G
In an after-show discussion, someone described 
Hassall’s film as ‘a hard watch’, a ‘marathon’. The 
response, I think, is based on a nexus of factors 
7 The painting – and it is 
a fictional one – features in 
Balzac’s short story The 
Unknown Masterpiece 
(1831).
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that include its minimalism, duration and refusal 
to provide the spectator with visual gratification. 
All we see are waves and shaky, partial shots of 
a ruin from a hand-held camera. At all times, 
Hassall reminds the viewer of the artificiality of 
the film, the fact that it has been made, pieced 
together. The wave we see, the wave that makes 
us seasick if we watch it for too long, is an image 
of the same wave. We think we are moving 
forwards, but in reality we have not moved at all. 
We are stuck, stranded on an endless reflux. As 
such, the implicit ‘heroism’ of the journey motif, 
so beloved of the ruin porn photographers and 
urban explorers who are attracted to the difficulty 
of getting to Hashima – it is, after all, a remote 
outcrop of rock that demands a certain kind of 
doughty commitment – is thus suspended, put on 
hold.8 The more you watch, the more you start to 
wonder. Is this really the East China Sea? Has the 
journey by boat actually been made? Is this 
Hashima? Has this been filmed by Hassall?
The images of the island itself add to the 
artifice – they are always seen through a pre-
existing frame of sorts. Hassall knows that the 
island is a site of prior looking, a site of image 
pollution. How then to counter this pollution? 
For Hassall, the solution was simple: to place it 
en abyme, to foreground our looking, to show it 
as a construct, the picturesque exposing its own 
‘picturesqueness’. It is surely no coincidence 
that one of the first images of the island that 
we see is that of the island from the boat. This 
is the only time we see the island as a whole 
image. Tellingly, however, two things quickly 
happen to disturb the pleasure of this momentary 
plenitude, this halting. First, the image appears 
to topple into the sea, as if it were the victim of 
some earth tremor; and, second, the image brings 
to mind another image repertoire, a celebrated 
one this time: Monet’s hazy depictions of Rouen 
cathedral, painted at more or less the same time 
that Hashima was being strip mined. Hassall takes 
us, the viewers, to Japan, and we end up thinking 
of French Impressionism, an art movement that 
was fond of Japanese and Chinese art, seduced by 
an image of the Orient. Could the same thing be 
happening here with Hashima? Easy to suspect it 
is. Hassall’s Hegelian joke, then: you go to Japan, 
and find nothing but yourself, your own image 
bank. But for all his playful cynicism, Hassall is 
not there just to tell jokes, to reverse the gaze. 
For what, I would wager, is lurking beneath these 
images is nothing other than geo-historical 
context, the same context that Impressionism, 
like the picturesque, was so concerned to 
brush stroke out of history: the eco-cide of 
industrialized modernity, the ‘inconvenient 
truth’ that we are all more than happy to forget. 
In Hassall’s film, the eye, ultimately, fails to lose 
itself in the wave. It is always returned – and 
again and again – to mangled fragments of 
industrial destruction, to the very history that 
scarred the island.
The second way that Hassall disturbs the 
picturesque eye, the eye that is comforted by 
this strangely familiar stage set of ruins, is by 
producing a sense of what Walter Benjamin 
terms ‘distraction’ (1969: 231), in his famous 
essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’. Whereas ‘serious art’ looks to 
fix our attention, to compel us to look at an 
image with a febrile, concentrated gaze in such 
a way that we do not see what resides behind 
the picture, Hassall, through the drone-like 
rhythm he sets up between images of the sea and 
images of the island, encourages the viewer to 
turn their attention to the side, to think of other 
things, to take in the image as one wills, as one 
can, on one’s own terms. Importantly, Hassall 
produces this distraction not by abandoning 
or dematerializing the film, but by fashioning 
animist images, images that touch the viewer and 
immerse them in the flow of the film, in how they 
produce drift.
Nevertheless, and at the same time, Hassall 
complicates this sense of immersion by producing 
an image of a wave that moves so much that our 
ability to concentrate is rendered inoperable. 
In the movement between looking at the 
vertiginous waves, and the slower (though still 
moving) images of the island, the eye is placed 
in an ambivalent space, caught, we might say, 
in the constellation of Gemini, wanting the 
image to end, wanting the image to continue. 
And, to return to Benjamin, what happens in 
this restless, irritating shift of images, if the 
audience is willing to stay with it, is, as I have 
mentioned previously, the production of a state 
of free-floating association. Importantly, this 
distraction is not the vapid distraction that we 
8 For more details on these 
artists, see Lavery and 
Hassall (2015: 117–18).
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normally experience when bored, the distraction 
that T. S. Eliot lambasted in the poem ‘Burnt 
Norton’ in The Four Quartets (1943). Rather, it is 
an animist distraction, a distraction that has been 
filtered through, and remains haunted by, the 
‘touch’ of images. In this animated, non-binary 
state of distraction, the mind takes off on its own 
errant journey, simultaneously able to wander 
where it will, and yet at the same time directed, 
encouraged into taking certain routes. So as 
I watch the thirty-minute duration of the film, 
and feel discomforted by its repetition, I start 
to set sail on a surfeit of visual analogies, all of 
which work together to create an eco-historical 
wave. First, I go back to the past and think of 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, a novella, 
published in 1899, which resonates with ideas of 
imperial exploitation of the planet’s human and 
natural resources; then, I change direction, and 
think, obviously perhaps, of the bomb dropped 
on Nagasaki, which drenched Hashima with black 
rain; then, things in the image start to speed up, 
and I am reminded of other sites of abandonment 
and ruin, Chernobyl, Fukushima, Bhopal, bright-
green rivers in China; then I hear the opening 
chords of Neil Young’s 1975 song, ‘Cortez the 
Killer’ about the conquistador Hernán Cortés, and 
link the line ‘dancing across the water’ with the 
holocausts and eco-cides that have taken place 
in Central and South America since the sixteenth 
century to the present; after which I turn to the 
future, and to the thought that Hashima might 
prefigure what is to come on an archipelago that 
is famous for earthquakes, tsunamis, tremors; 
and then, I wonder, in my animated state, if 
Hashima could be seen as a site-specific archive, 
a testament to an earth that is in the process 
of ‘unworlding’ itself, and is now open to the 
unsentimental play of the elements that have 
been in motion for so much longer than us, 
Homo sapiens.
These multiple thoughts and ideas that Return 
to Battleship Island amasses on top of each other, 
in unexpected configurations and agglomerations, 
are examples of the animated thinking produced 
by the ecological image, an image that troubles 
our conventional way of looking at the world by 
leaving an impress on the retina, the animistic 
touch of which allows the distress of the earth to 
emerge via a process of analogy and connection.
O N T O L O G Y
In Hassall’s film, images of waves follow waves. 
The images seem to twist and turn, to flux 
and reflux; they are turbulent. Instead of an 
iconography (the representation of a discrete 
object), Hassall give us what Serres in his 
discussion of La Belle noiseuse in Genesis calls 
‘ichnography’, the oceanic background or 
atmosphere in which objects are immersed, their 
‘noise’: ‘Ichnography is not harmony, it is noise 
itself.… There precisely is the origin. Noise and 
nausea, noise and navy belong to the same family’ 
(1995: 19).
As I watch the film, as I have done on many 
occasions now in the company of diverse 
audiences, I tend not to watch it with my eyes, 
but with my abdomen. I breathe with it, taking 
it in through my body, through my skin, through 
my mouth and thorax. Infected by airborne 
molecules, by inhalation and exhalation. Hassall 
is not interested in staging the image of Hashima, 
in the crystalline terms that both poet Ezra Pound 
and novelist Stendhal speak of, as something 
‘hard’ and ‘distinct’, a kind of illumination. On the 
contrary, what Hassall has tried –- and, I think, 
successfully –- to give us is the indistinctness, the 
background haze, that surrounds Hashima, and 
that blinds our eyes, as we try to make it out. In 
this spray, this animist buzz of atoms, Hashima is 
part of everything else, enveloped in a streaming, 
composite world, no longer a place or site in its 
own right, but always a place that is washed with 
and by the flux of becomings.
The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk might 
think of Hassall’s film, if he ever chanced upon it, 
in terms of foam, the airy, ungraspable substance 
that vanishes when we touch it. In Foams, the 
final instalment of Spheres, his mammoth three-
volume study of morphology and ontology, 
Sloterdijk proposes that foam is the form that best 
designates our current way of being in the world, 
a world that has now lost the contours of an 
older physics, the distinctiveness of objects being 
set apart from each other in space, within their 
own enclosed bubbles or spheres. In the delicate 
foam world we live in, what Sloterdijk names 
‘aphrology’, after the goddess Aphrodite, beings 
and entities are composite, relational, contingent 
– fragile ecosystems (2016: 27–71). They affect 
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and merge with each other momentarily, before 
uncoupling and taking off again in the search 
for new relationships, new turbulence. This has 
important ecological purchase in that the foam 
world, for Sloterdijk, is a world of interpenetrating 
systems and open-ended fronts, a world of 
‘unpredictabilities’ and delicate alignments. 
When blown by a strong gust of wind, foam 
alights where it will, where it can. It follows no 
set trajectory, and knows nothing of Euclidean 
geometry, with its distinct lines and shapes. 
Like the waves, and like the goddess, Aphrodite, 
that produced it, foam is destined to disappear, 
to disperse, but also to melt into things. It is 
experienced in the beat or fainting of rhythm, in 
a gap that is never empty.
As a result of its commitment to foam-like, 
floating movement, Return to Battleship Island 
offers a possibility of rethinking our ecological 
being in the world. Hassall’s film shows the island, 
an abandoned and toxic ruin, in the process of 
being reclaimed by the sea. In his picture of the 
waves, he points out the vanitas of human 
dwelling and gestures towards a future that will 
have erased the false hope of concrete, our 
obsession with permanence. The ruin here is not 
left waiting, as Benjamin’s ruins are in The Origin 
of German Tragic Drama, for a moment of 
redemption, some arc of messianic transcendence 
from a place beyond history (1998: 226). Rather 
the ruin, in finest Japanese tradition, is imaged, as 
the architect Murielle Hladik points out, in the 
process of being washed away, scattered to the 
winds, to the sea (2008: 57–75).9
In the foam world that Hassall conjures, there 
is no need to be made heavy or melancholic by 
this loss of solidity. For to live in foam is to affirm 
lightness, to embrace a new fragile ontology, 
if you will, a type of being that accepts its own 
impermanence, and is willing to face up to its 
own disappearance with a curious and complex 
blend of sadness and joy. What I am trying to say 
here is that Hassall’s film, in the so-called age of 
the Anthropocene, allows us to imagine an earth 
with a much longer geochronology than ours, and 
which posits human existence as mere froth on 
a wave. In the respect to which Hassall’s waves 
evoke foam-making turbulence and express, 
without ever making the mistake of spelling it out, 
the invisible atmosphere or noise of the world – 
its ichnography – they give us, I think, a striking 
example of the ecological work an animist image 
might do. It is important not to conflate that 
animistic intimacy with a Romantic view of the 
world. In Return to Battleship Island, the image 
does not represent the sea – ‘nature’ – as an object 
to look at, as a grounding for a masterful subject. 
Rather, it shows that we are connected to, bound 
by, and yet, for all that, somehow distanced from 
the animating pulse of the world – and always, it 
goes without saying, at its mercy. For, as Michel 
Serres points out, turbulence is both a ‘state of 
birth’, and ‘a death threat’ (1995: 121), a median 
experience in which nothing is ever resolved 
in any permanent sense. The difficulty, as well 
as the urgency, we face today might be how to 
reconcile ourselves with this animist noise, this 
exuberant foam, without overestimating our 
chances of ever being able to do so. In other words, 
the film asks what it might mean to be part of 
a fragile ecosystem, to be as finite as the planet 
on which we depend and that remains indifferent 
to our plight, as it continues on its own autotelic 
orbit. In this context, animism is not a source 
of transcendence or redemption, but a creative 
becoming, an outside that exists beyond human 
concerns, even as it provokes humans to live better 
with the worlds they are in and part of.
T A N G I B I L I T Y
In the animist reading I have advanced, Return to 
Battleship Island offers a new future for the ruins 
of Hashima. Importantly, there is no scenario 
sketched out for what that future may be. On the 
contrary, the future is always already here in the 
very act of experiencing and being disrupted by 
the work, again and again. In this respect, the 
work makes the future tangible through a logic of 
touch, by producing a sense of intimacy with the 
blasted landscape of images we look at and move 
through corporeally. In the syncopated rhythm it 
produces, the film allows spectators to see that 
they very definitely are ‘not alone in the world’, 
as Stengers says.
To make something tangible is not to grasp or 
hold onto it as a representation or image to gaze 
at or decipher. It is rather to be opened to its 
elusive caress and passage, to be with it as it 
passes in and through the world. From an animist 
9 In her chapter ‘Une 
absence de la ruine au 
Japon?’, Hladik shows how 
the ruin has a very 
different status in Japan 
than in the West. In Japan, 
the ruin is not privileged as 
a trace of some original 
plan. On the contrary, it 
hardly exists at all to the 
extent that dilapidated 
buildings and decaying 
structure are simply rebuilt 
as they were. In Japan, 
then, there is 
a performative relationship 
to the ruin, one in which 
impermanence and 
simulation are 
championed. The point is 
to celebrate emptiness, not 
to conserve.
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point of view, then, Return to Battleship Island, 
like the ruins it shows, operates as a kind of 
intermediary or messenger. It seeks to open 
a dialogue between two different parties who may 
or may not need help in negotiating a dispute. In 
the Anthropocene, the ‘dispute’ that the film 
negotiates is ultimately between the viewer and 
a ruined earth. Its critical and curative dimension 
resides in how it helps us to distance ourselves 
from the ideological fixity of a capitalist ‘present’ 
that would attempt to perpetuate its violence 
forever, and, instead, to experience the possibility 
of a different future coming into being as an 
affective charge, and not as a scenario that has 
already been thought through. The seasickness or 
nausea that the film generates, through its 
persistent and multiple returns to a moving wave, 
is where its futural potential resides – in how it 
makes tangible the open-ended flux of the world 
as something to endure and to be changed by. 
When read in tandem with the materialism of 
thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, Michel Serres and 
Peter Sloterdijk, the ‘new’ animism proposed by 
Stengers provides a resonant vocabulary for 
mapping that metamorphosis, for intuiting a new 
future of/for ruins.10 With Return to Battleship 
Island firmly in mind I would like to finish this 
article with a suitably provocative and open-ended 
statement from Murielle Hladik: ‘Là où il n’y a 
plus rien, l’histoire peut réappaître à nouveau’ 
(There where there is nothing, history can 
reappear differently) (2008: 64, my translation).
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10 This future is very 
different from how Hitler’s 
architect Albert Speer 
envisioned the future of 
ruins. Where Speer wanted 
the ruin to give the Berlin 
of the Third Reich a patina 
of historical conquest that 
would rival the cities of 
Rome and Athens, the 
future I am discussing is 
essentially unrepresentable 
and improbable. It cannot 
be foreseen.
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